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Introduction
Brock and Hommes (1997) show that an evolutionary competition between heterogeneous expectation rules may create complex endogenous dynamics. They consider a cobweb model in which firms have the choice between naive and rational expectations. Due to positive information costs, rational expectations pro-duce lower steady-state profits than naive expectations. If firms react strongly to this profit differential, the majority of them opt for naive expectations, making the market unstable. An important question is whether policy-makers can stabilize such dynamics. Extending the model by Brock and Hommes (1997) , Schmitt and Westerhoff (2015) demonstrate that policy-makers may be able to manage rational routes to randomness by introducing a proportional tax on firms' profits. The basic idea of their paper is that an increase in the tax rate reduces profit differentials between free naive expectations and costly rational expectations. As a result, more firms rely on rational expectations, bringing stability to the market. However, the stability-ensuring tax rate may become quite high and policy-makers may need to impose a high tax burden on firms in order to calm markets.
The aim of our paper is to show that policy-makers may be able to stabilize markets by imposing even a rather small profit-dependent lump-sum tax. To reduce the profit differential between competing expectation rules, it is not necessary to tax away a large part of firms' profits, but simply to eliminate the competitive edge of cheap destabilizing expectation rules. Our approach is also based on the model by Brock and Hommes (1997) and we seek to clarify our main argument by using the following examples. Suppose that the steady-state profit of a firm relying on naive expectations is 21, while a firm with rational expectations has, due to constant per period information costs of F = 1, a steady-state profit of 20. Under these assumptions, many firms may decide in favor of naive expectations and the market may, consequently, become unstable.
If policy-makers impose a lump-sum tax of λ = 1 on firms' profits exceeding a threshold value ofπ L = 20, the steady-state profits of firms using naive and rational expectations both become equal to 20. As a result, firms split evenly between rational and naive expectations, and the market becomes more stable. In contrast, a complete leveling of the firms' steady-state profits via a proportional profit tax necessitates a tax rate of 100 percent. Alternatively, if we assume that the market remains stable for profit differentails up to 0.5, a small lump-sum tax of λ = 0.5 or a rather substantial tax rate of 50 percent is needed to stabilize markets. These examples suggest that a profit-dependent lump-sum tax may cause a significantly lower tax burden for firms than a proportional profit tax, yet still manages to reduce the profit differentials of the expectation rules and to foster market stability.
Using a combination of analytical and numerical methods, we show that this elementary insight functions quite well, also out of equilibrium and in the presence of exogenous noise. In a deterministic environment, there exists a robust set of λ andπ L combinations for which the model's steady state is stable and for which the firms' tax burden may be regarded as modest. For our leading parameter setting, taken from Brock and Hommes (1997), we find that a stability-ensuring profit-dependent lump-sum tax -in relation to a stabilityensuring proportional profit tax -reduces the firms' tax burden by more than 95 percent. Of course, the challenge for policy-makers is to find suitable levels for the lump-sum tax and the profit threshold. Our results suggest that, in a noisy environment, policy-makers should increase λ and/or decreaseπ L to establish stable markets. Nevertheless, the firms' tax burden remains considerably lower than in the case of a proportional profit tax.
Our insights are not restricted to the specific cobweb model by Brock and Hommes (1997) ; they should also work in other models in which cheap destabilizing rules compete with costly stabilizing rules. For instance, Goeree and The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model by Brock and Hommes (1997) with profit-dependent lump-sum taxes and derive its dynamical system. Our analytical results are presented in Section 3. In particular, we compute the model's steady state and discuss how the intensity of choice and profit-dependent lump-sum taxes may affect its local asymptotic stability. In Section 4, we illustrate how the model's global dynamics depends on profit-dependent lump-sum taxes, and how policy-makers may control the market's volatility and the firms' tax burden. In Section 5, we summarize our main results and suggest a few avenues for future research.
A cobweb model with profit-dependent lump-sum taxes
We now extend the seminal cobweb model by Brock and Hommes (1997) by assuming that policy-makers may impose a profit-dependent lump-sum tax. After presenting the setup of the model in Section 2.1, we will derive its dynamical system in Section 2.2.
The setup of the model
Cobweb models describe the dynamics of a competitive market for a nonstorable consumption good. Since the good takes one period to produce, firms must form their price expectations one period ahead. Brock and Hommes (1997) assume that firms can choose between two different expectation rules. They can either buy a rational expectations forecast or freely obtain a naive forecast. The firms' rule selection is repeated at the beginning of each period, and depends on the past performance of the rules: the higher the profits of an expectation rule, the more firms will rely on it. Brock and Hommes (1997) show that the firms' rule selection behavior may cause complex dynamics. For increasing values of the intensity choice, price dynamics become more and more complicated. Schmitt and Westerhoff (2015) demonstrate that policy-makers may be able to manage such rational routes to randomness by imposing a proportional tax on positive profits. Unfortunately, the stability-ensuring profit tax rate increases with the firms' intensity of choice, and may become quite high. Since a high tax burden may be harmful for firms, in this paper we consider an alternative tax function. In particular, policy-makers may impose a profit-dependent lumpsum tax according to which firms have to pay a limited profit tax if their profits exceed a certain threshold value.
Let us turn to the details of the model. Market clearing takes place in every period, implying that
where D t and S t denote demand and supply at time step t, respectively. Consumer demand depends negatively on the current market price p t , and is expressed as
where a and b are positive parameters. In determining their production decisions, firms need to form price expectations one period ahead and choose between two different expectation rules. By normalizing the number of firms to N = 1, we can formalize their total supply as
While q N t and q R t represent the quantities supplied by firms with naive and rational expectations, n N t−1 and n R t−1 stand for their respective market shares. As in Brock and Hommes (1997) , firms face a quadratic cost function, i.e.
t with c > 0. Additionally, firms may have to pay a profit-dependent lump-sum tax, where λ t denotes the amount to be paid. Since firms expect with a (small) probability prob that policy-makers will abandon the tax, their profit maximization problem takes the form
5 where π e t and p e t stand for expected profits and expected prices, respectively. As it turns out, a firm's optimal supply is given by q t = cp e t .
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To form their price expectations, firms can either rely on a naive expectation rule by simply taking the last observed price as a forecast, i.e. p e t = p t−1 , or they can use a rational expectation (perfect foresight) rule, i.e. p e t = p t . Quantities supplied by firms with naive or rational expectations can thus be expressed as
and
respectively. While naive expectations are freely available, using rational expectations incurs constant per period information costs F > 0 (which do not influence firms' supply decisions and, for notational simplicity, have been neglected in (4)).
The fractions of firms with naive and rational expectations are updated over time according to an evolutionary fitness measure. Firms are boundedly rational in the sense that they tend to select the expectation rule with the highest fitness.
As in Brock and Hommes (1997) , firms use realized profits as the performance criterion. Since firms may have to pay a profit-dependent lump-sum tax, it is convenient to introduce first pre-tax profits. For the two expectation rules, firms' pre-tax profits in period t can be formalized aŝ
andπ R t = 0.5cp
respectively.
Firms only have to pay a profit tax if their pre-tax profits exceed the threshold valueπ L . The profit-dependent lump-sum tax is limited to λ. If firms'
pre-tax profits are higher thanπ H =π L + λ, firms need to pay the full amount λ. If their profits exceedπ L , but fall short ofπ H , they only have to pay the difference between their pre-tax profits and the threshold value. Accordingly, the tax functions of firms using naive and rational expectation are given by
Note that policy-makers have two control parameters: they can adjust the profitdependent lump-sum tax by shifting the threshold valueπ L and/or by changing the maximal tax payment λ.
Realized profits of naive and rational firms in period t can now easily be defined by
Brock and Hommes (1997) determine the fractions of firms choosing naive or rational expectations by the discrete choice model by Manski and McFadden (1981) , resulting in
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The key feature of this evolutionary approach is that more firms will choose the expectation rule that has the higher fitness. Parameter β denotes the firms'
intensity of choice and measures how sensitively they select the most profitable rule. For β = 0, firms do not observe any profit differentials between the two rules, and (13) and (14) imply that n N t = n R t = 0.5. When the intensity of choice increases, more and more firms opt for the rule that yields a higher profit. For β = ∞, firms observe fitness differentials perfectly, and all of them select the rule with the higher profit.
The model's dynamical system
Let us next derive the model's dynamical system. Substituting (5) and (6) into (3) and combining this expression with (1) and (2) leads to
Due to n N t−1 + n R t−1 = 1, the model's steady-state price turns out to be
Furthermore, solving (15) explicitly for p t yields
Accordingly, the current price p t depends on the expectation rules' market shares of the previous period, i.e. n N t−1 and n R t−1 . Once p t is known, the fitness of the two expectation rules can be identified, and the new market shares n N t and n R t follow via (13) and (14) . Given n N t and n R t , the next equilibrium price p t+1 can be determined, and so on.
Since it is convenient to rewrite the model's dynamical system in deviations from the steady-state price, we follow Brock and Hommes (1997) and introducẽ
If we, furthermore, define the difference between the fractions of firms using rational and naive expectations as m t = n can represent our model by the two-dimensional nonlinear map:
where
Note that (19) depends on the relative fitness of rational expectations over naive expectations, which we define as π
. If all firms are always exempt from profit taxes (λ 
Analytical insights
The two-dimensional nonlinear map (18)-(23) admits the unique steady state:
with
While the steady-state pricep * is independent of the profit-dependent lump-sum tax, the steady-state fraction m * depends on λ andπ L .
To determine the stability properties of the steady state, we have to find the two eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the model's dynamical system at the steady state. Straightforward computations yield
A necessary and sufficient condition for the model's steady state to be locally asymptotically stable, henceforth denoted by LAS, is given by |z 1,2 | < 1 (see, 
The same stability condition applies to Case 2 in whichπ
neither of the two types of firms must pay profit taxes, i.e. λ 
Note that the model's steady state is now always LAS, irrespective of the firms' intensity of choice. The reason for this outcome is quite simple. Steady-state profits of naive and rational firms are both equal toπ L , which is why half of these rely on stabilizing rational expectations.
2 In contrast to the nine possible out-of-equilibrium combinations of λ N t and λ R t , the three steady-state combinations λ N * = 0 and λ R * = λ, λ N * = 0 and λ R * =π R * −π L , and λ N * =π N * −π L and λ R * = λ do not exist. This is because, while rational expectations may outperform naive expectations out of equilibrium, naive expectations are always more profitable than (costly) rational expectations at the steady state.
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Case 4 applies ifπ
Naive firms must then pay the maximum tax amount, while rational firms are exempt from taxation. Since λ N * = λ and λ R * = 0, stability condition (31) can be expressed as 
and λ R * = 0. Accordingly, only naive firms must pay profit taxes and the tax payments by these firms are below the maximum lump-sum tax. Stability condition (31) can thus be rewritten as
where Since λ N * = λ and λ R * =π R * −π L , we obtain from stability condition (31)
where y =π Policy-makers may furthermore wish to keep the firms' tax burden low, which is defined by 
Numerical insights
In this section, we first present a number of simulations to illustrate how the model's global dynamics depends on the intensity of choice and on profitdependent lump-sum taxes. We then explore the impact of profit-dependent lump-sum taxes on the market's volatility and the firms' tax burden, and attempt to derive a number of policy recommendations.
Global dynamics
Our analytical results suggest that policy-makers may use profit-dependent lump-sum taxes to support the LAS of the model's steady-state. As we will see, our local stability results are quite robust, and help us to understand the global behavior of the model. 
. It becomes evident from
) that an increasing profit threshold leads to higher profit differentials. Hence, the profit threshold needs to be decreased in order to stabilize the dynamics. To investigate whether these results are robust, we add exogenous noise to the dynamics. In the second and third column of Figure 2 , we repeat our sim- 
Volatility, tax burden and policy implications
Our analytical and numerical analysis reveals the existence of a large/robust set of (λ,π L )-parameter combinations that calm the model's dynamics. Next, we extend our analysis and study how profit-dependent lump-sum taxes jointly affect the market's volatility and the firms' tax burden. As a measure for the market's volatility, we use the standard deviation of the price (in deviations from its steady state)
where T andp represent the length and the mean of the underlying sample. We compute the firms' mean tax burden as
Our simulations are based on a sample length of T = 10, 000 periods, where a transient phase of 1,000 periods has been omitted. sum tax in the range of 17.8 <π L < 18 and 3.6 < λ < 4 yields a volatility level lower than 0.15 and a mean tax burden of around 1.35.
Conclusions
The seminal cobweb model by Brock and Hommes (1997) reveals that an evolutionary competition between cheap destabilizing and costly stabilizing expectations rules may create complex endogenous dynamics. In recent years, this approach has gained tremendous empirical support, as documented in Hommes (2013), for instance. Schmitt and Westerhoff (2015) show that policy-makers may be able to calm such dynamics by imposing a proportional profit tax. Since high tax rates reduce the profit advantage of cheap destabilizing expectation rules, costly stabilizing expectation rules gain in popularity and, as a result, markets become more stable. In this paper, we show that policy-makers may also stabilize markets by imposing profit-dependent lump-sum taxes. An important insight of our analysis is that it is not necessary to impose high profit taxes to reduce profit differentials between competing expectation rules. If destabilizing expectation rules outperform stabilizing expectation rules because stabilizing expectation rules incur positive per period information costs, as assumed in Brock and Hommes (1997) and many other related papers, policy-makers may reduce the expectation rules' profit differentials by imposing a rather modest profit-dependent lump-sum tax. Our analysis suggests that such a tax does not only work locally in a deterministic framework, but also in a noisy out-ofequilibrium environment. While the effectiveness of profit-dependent lump-sum taxes depends on the noise level, policy-makers may even be able to stabilize markets and limit firms' tax burden for higher noise levels.
Our analysis is based on the cobweb model by Brock and Hommes (1997) , and may be extended in various directions. First of all, one could consider the case that firms have a choice between a different pair of competing expectation rules, say naive and adaptive expectations. Similarly, one could study a model version in which firms can apply more than two expectations rules. It would be interesting to assume that these rules have different constant or even flexible cost advantages. In our setup, firms only take the last observed profit of the expectations rules into account. However, firms may use a smoothed measure of past realized profits as a fitness criterion. Relatedly, the firms' rule selection behavior may depend on additional socio-economic principles such as current market circumstances or herding effects. One could also investigate the effects of profit-dependent lump-sum taxes for other markets. For instance, can a profitdependent lump-sum tax be used to influence the behavior of financial market participants who switch between technical and fundamental trading rules? In this paper we ask whether policy-makers can stabilize markets by imposing a small profit-dependent lump-sum tax. We believe that market stability is an important policy goal in reality but, of course, it would also be interesting to explore this issue in more detail from a welfare perspective. To conclude, the basic message of our paper -policy-makers' opportunity to reduce cost disadvantages of stabilizing expectation rules via profit-dependent lump-sum taxes and thereby to support market stability without causing high tax burdens -seems to be quite useful and worthwhile for further investigations. 
